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T HE domestic air freight industry has exhibited a steady growth since
the filing of the first freight tariff in 1944. Traffic has increased from
less than thirty million ton-miles in 1946 to almost 630 million ton-miles
in 1962. This growth while sizeable has not been equally shared by the
two carrier groups of the industry, the all-cargo airlines and the passenger-
carrying airlines. As Table I demonstrates, since 1956 the passenger car-
riers (primarily the domestic trunk airlines) have gained at the expense
of the all-cargo airlines not only in market share, but in absolute volume.
The three all-cargo airlines which are operating today are the sole sur-
vivors of what was originally hundreds of non-scheduled airlines. The
1962 data shows the only reversal in this trend to be the re-entry of Slick
Airways into active participation in the industry.
TABLE I
RELATIVE SHARE OF AIR FREIGHT GROWTH BY CLASS OF CARRIER
Total Volume
Ton-miles Percentage Share by Carrier Class
Year (Mil.) Per Cent Domestic Trunk Local Service All-Cargo
1955 284 0.0 61.2 0.5 38.3
1956 332 100.0 57.3 0.6 42.2
1957 376 100.0 58.2 0.6 41.3
1958 364 100.0 66.0 0.6 33.3
1959 426 100.0 66.3 0.7 33.0
1960 448 100.0 71.6 0.9 27.5
1961 468 100.0 82.1 1.2 16.7
1962 629 100.0 75.3 1.1 23.5
Source: 1962 ATA Facts and Figures, p. 23 (the percentages are calculated from
the data).
In view of the decline of the all-cargo airlines in number and in relative
market share, the question of their survival becomes increasingly important.
Under Title I, Section 102 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958,' the Civil
Aeronautics Board (CAB) has the role of developing policies to encourage
the growth of the air transport industry. By creating and modifying
minimal standards for rates and service and establishing the policy of
selecting carriers to develop this market through certification as common
carriers, the Board has been a stimulus to the existing air freight industry.2
One question of significant importance is whether its present policies en-
t Graduate School of Business Administration, U.C.L.A. The author would like to acknowledge
the helpful comments of Assistant Professor Richard N. Farmer of U.C.L.A. who reviewed an
earlier draft of this paper.
1 72 Stat. 740, 49 U.S.C. § 1302 (1958) which supercedes an equivalent section under Title I,
Para. 2 of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 980, 49 U.S.C. S 403 (1938).
'For a description of current CAB activities in this area, see 1962 C.A.B. Ann. Rep. 19-22.
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courage this growth or are they creating an environment in which the all-
cargo carriers cannot survive?
This paper discusses some of the economic factors influencing the de-
velopment of the industry, particularly the relationship of costs to revenue
as it bears on competition. The cost structure for air freight will be de-
scribed for both the passenger carriers and the all-cargo airlines and
measured against revenues to establish relative profitability. This will lead
to the hypothesis that the shift in the market share can be traced to differ-
ences in profit. This analysis will provide a basis to discuss some possible
policy alternatives and their usefulness for the development of the in-
dustry. If profits are lacking, CAB policy must be directed toward re-
storing them if the goal of the development of the industry is to be
realized.
II. THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
The question of survival of the all-cargo airlines is one of competition
with the passenger airlines. We must first determine the magnitude of this
competition and then look for possible competitive advantages of the pas-
senger airlines over the all-cargo airlines. From such evidence, implica-
tions can be drawn for the future performance of the industry, and these
in turn can suggest guidelines for policy alternatives.
The existence of competition between the two types of carriers depends
upon the presence of a homogeneous market. A common test of homo-
geneity is whether the prices of different suppliers bear any market re-
lationship to each other, i.e., in economic terms, is there a cross elasticity
of demand among the carriers? Evidence of the essential unity of the
market can be found in the price schedules for the service. On the supply
side, the passenger airlines have demonstrated this homogeneity by offering
freight service in both passenger and all-cargo aircraft. While some
technical distinctions are made in maximum sizes, schedule speed and
frequency, no price distinctions are made by the carriers offering both
types of service. This same homogeneity is evidenced on the demand side
between the two classes of carriers. Shippers are particularly sensitive to
rate differences between carriers, and this is reflected in intense price com-
petition shown by closely matched price lists in the carriers' tariff filings.
In summary, there is little distinction in the market between the two types
of service, and they can be considered to be in direct competition with
each other.
The passenger carriers have an obvious advantage over the all-cargo
carriers in the number of schedules offered. Because every passenger air-
craft can potentially haul freight, every passenger schedule is capable of
being classified as a freight schedule. The all-cargo carriers are limited in
comparison. This advantage would not be as significant if all-cargo sched-
ules were more highly developed with more investment directed into all-
cargo aircraft. The lack of investment suggests low profits due to high
costs relative to revenues. The real advantage of the passenger airlines in
freight movement lies in the nature of their incremental costs. As long as
freight is handled on passenger aircraft, it can be treated as a by-product
of passenger service and will avoid any direct transportation charges. The
only charges that this traffic must bear are the terminal charges at the
ends of the flight.
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In contrast, the cost of moving freight by all-cargo aircraft is con-
siderably higher, and includes not only the terminal costs, but also the
costs of operating the aircraft. These include crew salaries, fuel, mainten-
ance, insurance and depreciation.' These costs vary with the type of aircraft
flown, the average length of the route segment and the airline's operating
and maintenance policies. Costs vary also with the volume of traffic and
thus become incremental in the sense that they are proportionate to the
amount of freight carried.4
If it is not a by-product of a passenger service, a shipment will incur
direct costs of transportation from one airport terminal to another, plus a
portion of the terminal cost which can be charged to that portion of
traffic. In a longer view, the cost of air freight includes not only these
directly incurred expenses, but other costs such as sales, administration and
other overhead expense items which are indirectly related to the air freight
side of the airline business. The ability to identify the incremental costs
of air freight service in airline accounts is limited. Some costs such as the
cost of operating freight terminals and all-cargo aircraft may be isolated,
but many other costs cannot be. Some administrative costs of passenger
airlines may be caused by both passenger and freight traffic and thus can-
not be divided except by arbitrary accountants. Other costs are potentially
identifiable but are hidden within broad accounting classifications. Cur-
iously, the all-cargo airlines also have similar cost identification problems
in dividing common overhead costs between their freight operations and
their other sources of business. Total costs for freight are therefore ap-
proximations and appear precise only by arbitrary cost allocations.
The importance of the incremental cost concept is in tracing the way
in which these costs behave with changes in the volume of traffic. The
costs of passenger airlines differ from those of the all-cargo airlines be-
cause of the by-product element of freight on passenger airlines. As an
airline develops freight traffic, it will first seek to utilize its lowest cost
capacity, i.e., the capacity available on its passenger aircraft.' Because of
package size restrictions, limited schedules offered at the most opportune
times for freight movement, and the low revenue priority for freight as
compared to mail, express and baggage, this immediate capacity may be
filled before demand is satisfied. The purpose behind the all-cargo serv-
ice on the passenger airlines is then to supplement the service offered on
their passenger aircraft. The importance of all-cargo service to the pas-
senger airlines can be seen in Table II. Among this airline group, the
passenger airlines that were carrying the largest volume of freight traffic
were also the most heavily committed to the use of all-cargo equipment.
Of the eleven domestic trunk airlines, only three carriers did not use
all-cargo equipment during 1962.
'Depreciation could be considered to be a sunk cost in the sense that an aircraft once pur-
chased is "committed" to the airline. However, aircraft are highly mobile capital equipment, and
can be transferred to many services on an airline, e.g., from one route to another, and also from
one airline to another through sales, lease, etc., and are thus considered here to be related to
output.
'An incremental cost is defined here as the cost incurred for the next unit of output.
'Potentially, this can represent a large amount of available lift. Each Boeing 707 has a baggage
compartment capacity of approximately 18,000 lbs., the Douglas DC-8, 14,000 lbs. This can be
compared to an aircraft commonly used for all-cargo services through the early 1950's, the
DC-4, which had a total payload of about 18,000 pounds when used exclusively for freight.
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TABLE II
FREIGHT CARRIED BY DOMESTIC TRUNK AIRLINES
IN 1962 BY TYPE OF AIRCRAFT
Total Freight Carried By Passenger Aircraft By Cargo Aircraft
Ton -miles Ton-miles Ton-miles
Carrier (000) Per Cent (000) Per Cent (000) Per Cent
American Airlines 153,824 100.0 73,203 47.6 80,621 52.4
Braniff Airways 13,724 100.0 9,688 70.6 4,036 29.4
Continental Airlines 9,708 100.0 9,708 100.0 - -
Delta Airlines 31,027 100.0 25,219 81.3 5,808 18.7
Eastern Airlines 27,681 100.0 21,108 76.3 6,573 25.7
National Airlines 19,595 100.0 13,669 69.8 5,926 30.2
Northeast Airlines 3,342 100.0 3,342 100.0 - -
Northwest Airlines 19,435 100.0 18,042 92.8 1,393 7.2
Trans World Airlines 63,689 100.0 46,505 73.0 17,184 27.0
United Airlines 126,837 100.0 71,216 56.1 55,621 43.9
Western Airlines 5,706 100.0 5,706 100.0 - -
Source: ATA, Flight and Traffic Statistics (data from pages entitled Domestic
Trunk Airlines, Twelve Months Ending December 31, 1962, Total of
Scheduled Airlines Service, and Domestic Trunk Airlines, Twelve Months
Ending December 31, 1962, Non-passenger Service Operations).
To further illustrate the use of all-cargo equipment on passenger air-
lines, comparisons have been made in Table III for the years 1956 and
1962 of the changes which have occurred in total passenger aircraft cargo
capacity available, and the traffic volumes moving via these carriers on
passenger aircraft and all-cargo aircraft.' The data reflects the enormously
large increase in capacity available on passenger aircraft, so that a total
growth of the traflic carried was reflected by traffic increases on passenger
aircraft which exceeded those on the all-cargo aircraft of the same air-
lines by three and one-half times. Data for 1960 showed almost the re-
verse. At that time, increases in freight on passenger aircraft had increased
only two per cent over 1956, the growth going to the all-cargo service of
these carriers. However, even the expansion of jet passenger cargo capacity
has not prevented an increase in the use of all-cargo equipment.
TABLE III
CHANGES IN CAPACITY AND TRAFFIC ON
DOMESTIC TRUNK AnRLINES, 1956-1962
(Ton-miles 000,000)
Total Ton- By Passenger By All-cargo
Year Capacity miles-Carried Aircraft Aircraft
1956 1248 332 183 149
1962 4225 475 297 177
Percentage Increase 3397% 43% 62% 18%
Source: ATA, Flight and Traffic Statistics.
The incremental cost of carrying freight for the passenger airlines has
two steps. The first reflects the lower cost of by-product capacity. The
second stage is where all-cargo capacity is used and therefore shows higher
a Capacity was estimated by taking total ton-miles available during the given year, subtracting
that capacity which could not be used for freight (exclusively passenger seat-mile capacity converted
to ton-miles), baggage allowance, and the mail, express, and excess baggage, and cargo carried on
cargo aircraft. The remainder provides a minimal estimate of capacity which could have been
utilized for freight movement. Because all seats were not filled, this tends to understate actual
capacity available. However, the choice of routes and schedule times tend to reduce it.
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cost. The airlines have naturally sought to minimize the use of all-cargo
equipment. However, with increases in freight traffic which do not fit the
passenger schedules or where no more capacity is available, schedules must
be met by the use of all-cargo aircraft.
For the all-cargo airlines, costs can be projected more easily. All changes
in the volume of traffic are reflected eventually in changes in aircraft miles
flown, and the costs are directly proportionate to the traffic.
For both carrier groups changes in air freight volume independent of
other demands require the use of all-cargo equipment. This implies parallel
incremental costs of freight operation reflecting the use of high operating
cost resources. If by-product and all-cargo costs are averaged for each
carrier, the passenger airlines clearly have lower costs because their average
costs include the first step of by-product capacity. The relevant costs for
airline managers, however, are not the averages but the costs of supplying
the next unit of capacity which are the incremental costs of all-cargo
service.'
We cannot explain directly the shift in relative market share in terms
of cost if the incremental costs are equal. However, if the incremental costs
are larger than the associated revenues, this would explain the tendency of
both groups of carriers to want to reduce this type of service. For the all-
cargo airlines, apparently unprofitable freight business has encouraged them
to pursue other more profitable markets such as charter and military con-
tract operations. Only when these sources of revenue are not available is
air freight attractive to them. For the passenger airlines, incremental costs
may also exceed revenues although average costs may be less than average
revenues and freight is therefore profitable on an overall basis.
Why, then, is there continued investment in this seemingly unprofitable
industry? For the all-cargo airlines, the scheduled freight operations be-
come a means of cushioning otherwise very erratic revenue fluctuations.
For the passenger carriers, air freight may be considered a long-term in-
vestment where the future market position may produce potential rewards
exceeding the present costs. In addition, the retention of the present air
freight business may depend on the constant availability of sufficient
standby capacity to serve the market, i.e., all-cargo equipment. Another
possibility is the imprecision of establishing a true incremental cost be-
cause of the nature of costs so that management may only be able to
gauge the worth of participation by the revenues that it contributes to the
total operation.
The implication of this discussion is that the decline in all-cargo carrier
market share suggests a lack of profit s If these conditions continue, the
all-cargo carriers could eventually withdraw completely, and the remain-
ing service would be closely tied to the support of passenger service. Is
this consistent with the CAB's policy commitment to the development of
the industry? Or is the policy intended to create fully self-supporting
carriers that can develop this business independently of other sources of
revenue?
'This was reflected in the CAB findings in the original Air Freight Rate Investigation, 9 C.A.B.
340, 344 (1948).
s Because of the impossibility of identifying the full costs of freight service, even for all-cargo
airlines, concerning profitability, conclusive evidence could not be presented from CAB data.
However, profit and loss accounts for these carriers including other revenues also support this
implication.
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III. POLICY ALTERNATIVES
We have already mentioned the unprofitable condition of the air freight
industry under the present CAB policy. If possible, some policy alterna-
tives should be available to improve the financial condition of the indus-
try and promote its further development (excluding direct subsidy).
Before examining other alternatives, we should specify some of the con-
ditions laid down under present policy. These fall into three categories:
(1) entry controls, (2) minimum rate levels and (3) service level controls.
Entry controls have been mentioned earlier. The purpose behind them
was to protect the industry against excessive competition which apparently
tended to drive rates below cost established by the CAB.' Of the four
carriers which were selected for certification as common carriers in 1949,
only two remain. 0 In 1956, two additional carriers were granted certificates,
of which only one is still operating in the air freight industry." This sug-
gests that even the regulatory process has failed to halt the pressures of
competition and unprofitable operation.
Minimum rate controls were instituted at an even earlier date than entry
controls. In 1948, the CAB, recognizing the vulnerability of the all-cargo
carriers to the cost structure of the passenger carriers, passed a Minimum
Rate Order which established rates on the basis of the operating costs of
all-cargo equipment. This order was modified in subsequent proceedings,
but allowed to stand until 1960 at which time it was revoked in order to
remove the inhibiting effect of regulatory rate standards on individual
carrier rate structures. In recent years, rates have been almost consistently
higher than the levels under the minimum rate level, and the competitive
performance of the industry leads to the conclusion that these legal mini-
mum rates have actually been maintained at levels below cost.
Closely related to the rate levels has been the service level. As the in-
dustry has developed, the time requirements of the service have tightened
considerably. From the two-day service associated with the early post-
war years, the time dimension has been reduced to overnight service along
the main routes and one-and-a-half day service elsewhere. The time re-
duction and seasonal overcapacity led the Board to distinguish between
two types of service: one at the "standard" level of rates, which was over-
night, and a lower level "deferred service," which was to be used to fill
out otherwise unused capacity. This, however, required a minimum four-
day transit time between pick-up and delivery at substantially reduced
rates." This allowed carriers to discriminate among traffic on a time basis,
and it has also tended to preserve minimal service standards for the "first
class" service.
The constraints of present policy have led to a firmly established con-
cept of regulation in which the restriction on entry, rates and service
standards have been bound together in a related combinatign. In con-
sidering policy recommendations, many alternative combinations of these
variables could be explored to examine their potential effects on the in-
dustry. Only a few which appear more plausible can be included here.
The fundamental alternative to regulation is the removal of all entry
'Air Freight Rate Investigation, 9 C.A.B. 340 (1948).
1"Air Freight Case, 10 C.A.B. 572 (1949).
"Air Freight Certificate Renewal Case, 23 C.A.B. 186 (1956).
" The four-day time period refers to trans-continental service, three days being allowed for
intermediate service. See The Deferred Air Freight Case, 23 C.A.B. 651 (1956).
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controls to allow free competition. This condition existed prior to CAB
intervention in the industry in 1948 when the all-cargo airlines petitioned
for minimum rate protection." A return to these conditions could serve
to drive out the all-cargo airlines, or it could force a radical change in
the type of service available. While any comments on this type of policy
are conjectural, it does not appear to be feasible within the present climate
of transportation policy. However, it does serve as an alternative to non-
optimal regulatory policy.
A second alternative is to maintain service at the present time dimen-
sions and to explore possible changes in rate levels. One possibility would
be to continue the present policy without substantial change. However,
this would obviously further the present industry competitive trend. The
principal argument for this approach is that it has a continuity with past
regulatory experience and is consistent with the investment decisions of
the carriers that have been made under it. As suggested earlier, incremental
costs are not covered by revenues, and the operating losses would encourage
further withdrawal of all-cargo services in addition to further dependence
on the by-product capacity from passenger service.
Another possibility within the present level of service is to raise the
rate level. This is only feasible if demand for the service is inelastic and
therefore would not be reduced. This does not appear consistent with
further development of the industry. Even if the industry could be made
self sufficient and all-cargo service became profitable, the growth of the
industry would depend on secular forces outside the control of the in-
dustry.
A further variation in policy would be to recognize the dependency of
air freight on support from passenger revenue. Policy would then be
directed toward encouragement of more joint-cost operations, i.e., combi-
nation passenger-cargo flights with cargo occupying more of the pay-
load capacity than is done now under baggage compartment loading. Air-
craft could be modified for flexible loading of passengers and freight with
the proportions depending on traffic demand. This has been tried by several
airlines in the past and could be further developed with more competitive
equipment. Where evening passenger schedules may be marginally revenue-
producing, combination flights could contribute more revenues than
either type of service alone. However, this alternative does have the
disadvantage that freight schedules would not be operated independently
of passenger movements. Another type of combination in operation would
be the use of freight aircraft with convertible interiors, changeable be-
tween passenger and freight service, so that daytime schedules would be
operated for passenger services and nighttime schedules for freight.
While these alternatives do not provide for independent operation of
air freight service, they may provide financially profitable operations
within the 10resent service constraint. But at the same time, they sound
the death knell for the all-cargo carriers unless they are allowed to carry
passengers.
The third element of regulation in the industry has been the time dimen-
sion. The standard air freight service today is sold to the shipping public
on an overnight basis geared to the time dimensions of the business day.
The freight is picked up in the later afternoon, and delivered, if possible,
'3 Air Freight Rate Investigation, 9 C.A.B. 340 (1948).
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the next day. Because of the time requirement for terminal processing, the
aircraft that carry this freight are bound by schedules that are even
shorter. Utilization of all-cargo equipment is therefore low, requiring the
capital investment to be spread over very few flight hours. " In addition
to the daily schedules, a lack of traffic on the weekends contributes to
this dilemma. In the desire to sell a premium freight service, the airlines
with the sanction of the CAB have developed an exceedingly high cost
service. Announcements of new cargo aircraft have included promises of
lower operating costs. Low operating costs require efficient utilization, but
how can more efficient aircraft lower the cost of service sufficiently if their
depreciation costs are spread over so few hours of flight time? This problem
becomes imperative when we compare capital costs of new equipment with
the costs of aircraft that are now contributing to the high cost dilemma."
One possible solution to this problem of high cost may be found in
changing the total service and rate combination which has governed the
industry. If the one-day service which is presently being offered to the
shipping public is changed to a longer time period, possibilities of reducing
cost become apparent. Air freight as a two-day service would allow
operating schedules free from the direct pressure of traffic. Freight could
be moved in a continuous shuttle with much improved utilization of both
the aircraft and ground facilities. By reducing peak hour demands on
facilities, operating aircraft in a more optimal manner, and encouraging
limited backlogs of traffic to provide for more efficient use of the aircraft
that are flying, the costs can be reduced.
The reduced service level then requires an estimate of the price level
necessary to attract traffic under these new conditions. This will depend
on the competitive time advantage left to air freight over surface competi-
tion. If sufficient time advantage still remains, it may be possible to attract
traffic at rates sufficiently high to cover the lower costs of service. Esti-
mates of demand for premium freight service have been necessarily crude
given the limited data available. Several estimates published by aircraft
manufacturers indicated volumes vastly exceeding present capacity.' These
estimates have been based on known traffic moving today via common
carrier trucking, rail forwarder, rail less carload, and express over dis-
tances where airline competition could be effective. All of this is not
potential air freight, even when it is moving between parallel points, but
the proportion becomes larger the lower the rates become.
To return to the original problem, what could happen to the industry
structure and the fate of the all-cargo carriers? One possibility is that all
of the capacity on passenger aircraft not now being used because of sched-
ule times, would then absorb all of the additional traffic generated at lower
rates. This would provide a new advantage in terms of the cost to society by
utilizing capacity for which the cost is already being incurred. The ex-
cess would be carried on all-cargo equipment, presumably at costs less than
the revenues. The two problems which have to be faced in analyzing this
alternative are whether costs can be reduced sufficiently so that the
14 Utilization data for the DC-7F all-cargo aircraft for 1962 indicates average daily utilization
of approximately five hours per day compared to an average of eight or more for passenger aircraft
flying comparable route patterns.
's In 1953, a DC-6A cost $1,150,000. A DC-8F Jet Freighter today will cost $6,688,000.
" See, e.g., Brewer, Air Cargo, The Next Ten Years, Boeing Airplane Co., Seattle, Wash., (1957);
Douglas Aircraft Co., Rep. No. SM 23088, The Air Cargo Handbook (1958).
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revenues can attract the necessary volume of traffic and whether demand
would be sufficient to require all-cargo service.
The alternatives mentioned above presume a policy of continuing com-
petition within the industry by both carrier groups. An additional choice
open to the Board was suggested by a recent "white paper" submitted to
the CAB by the all-cargo airlines." They argue for limiting competition
by barring the domestic trunk airlines from carrying freight in all-
cargo aircraft, limiting their activity in the field to whatever they can
carry on passenger flights. To support their case they urge a recognition
of separate roles for the two classes based on the historical precedent of
the original finding of need of all-cargo service by the Board when the
carriers were originally granted common carrier status.' 8
Without examining the legal basis for this argument, the case on
economic grounds seems tenuous. This alternative is a proposal to protect
some of the competitors in the industry against the others, limiting compe-
tition in order to preserve the position of the all-cargo airlines. If all-cargo
operation in its present form is not profitable for either group, the argu-
ment says that traffic should be diverted from the trunk airlines to the
all-cargo airlines in order to increase their load factors. If this would make
all-cargo service profitable for them, could not this argument be turned
around, and presented in favor of the domestic trunk carriers, so that
they would carry the freight instead of the presently unprofitable all-
cargo carriers?
There is no need to advance the merits of either side here. The choice
is really between a protectionist philosophy of regulation, and one which
will advance the public economic welfare by means of more thorough-
going competition. Instead of seeking ways to block competition, we
should be seeking more imaginative ways to make it work.
IV. CONCLUSION: REGULATORY DILEMMA
In this article we have noted the decline in the relative share of the market
for the all-cargo airlines. In analyzing the reason for this decline, we noted
that the relevant cost was the cost of all-cargo service, and that this cost
appeared to exceed the revenues for the service. The net result was a trend
toward a withdrawal of resources from the industry. Because this industry
condition is the result of present regulatory policies, this policy and its
alternatives were explored to see if better results are possible than under
present policies. One approach was to abandon regulation, but results could
not be predicted. Two alternatives within the regulatory scheme were
posed which have some chance of success. One is to increase the depen-
dency on passenger service by encouraging the further extension of joint
passenger-cargo operations. While this would promote more profitable serv-
ice for the passenger carriers, it would exclude the all-cargo carriers from
further participation in the market. A second alternative is to reduce the
service standard for the normal categories of air freight in order to reduce
costs of operation which would then permit reduced rates, the most effective
way to expand the market for air freight. However, this way is also un-
"The Role of All-Cargo Aircraft in the Domestic Airfreight Industry, submitted in un-
published form to the CAB by The Slick Corporation, The Flying Tiger Line, Inc. and Riddle
Airlines, Inc. (1963).
'sAir Freight Case, 10 C.A.B." 572 (1949).
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certain depending on whether the costs can be reduced sufficiently, and
whether the demand will be attracted in volumes and at rates sufficiently
high to cover the costs of the service.
The present policies will not preserve the industry as it is today. One
alternative is to make the service more profitable by wedding it more
tightly to the passenger side of the airlines, but this will not encourage the
full development of the industry. The other is to make a break with the
past policies to provide a slightly lower quality service at a much lower
cost. While this path is more uncertain, it may provide the only way
to encourage an all-cargo service, by either passenger or all-cargo airlines.
In developing alternatives to a policy which is having adverse effects on
the industry, we are forced to recognize that no policy under regulation
will create optimal solutions. However legitimate the causes which led to
regulation of the industry, they have created a dilemma from which there
is apparently little escape.*
* Editor's note: After this article was completed, trade news sources reported that the CAB
was contemplating an enlargement of the authority of all-cargo and supplemental airlines and a
curtailment of trunk airline air-cargo operations. See Aviation Week & Space Technology, Feb. 3,
1964, p. 41. If this proposal is formally approved by the Board its implications will be considered
in a future issue of the journal.
